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NOTES 
ATIORNEYS-SELF-INCRIMINATION-The Attorney's 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a 
Disbarment Proceeding 
A state court has jurisdiction to deal with the alleged misconduct 
of attorneys practicing before it either explicitly by statute1 or by ' 
virtue of its power to control the conduct of its own affairs.2 Indeed, 
it can suspend or disbar an attorney who fails to maintain the stand-
ard of conduct established for members of the legal profession.3 
One aspect of such a standard is that an attorney is bound not to 
obstruct the administration of justice, a duty which imposes upon 
him an affirmative obligation to cooperate with the courts.4 The 
question frequently arises whether, in order to satisfy the requisite 
standard of cooperation, an attorney must forfeit his privilege 
against self-incrimination.5 Courts have consistently held that an 
attorney cannot be disbarred for having asserted the privilege in 
a previous criminal trial or grand jury proceeding,6 but differences 
of opinion have arisen when an attorney has invoked the privilege 
during a judicial inquiry into alleged unprofessional activities of 
members of the bar.7 In Cohen v. Hurley,8 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of an attorney's disbar-
ment on the ground that, in the course of such an investigation, 
1. E.g., N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(2): 
The supreme court shall have power and control over attorneys • • • and all 
persons practicing or assuming to practice law, and the appellate division of the 
supreme court in each department is authorized to censure, suspend from prac• 
tice • • • any attorney • . • who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, 
fraud, ••• or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice •••. 
2. Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364 (1868); Ex parte Thompson, 228 Ala. 
113, 152 So. 229 (1933); In re Clifton, 115 Fla. 168, 155 So. 324 (1934); West v. Field, 
181 Ga. 152, 181 S.E. 661 (1935); .Bar Ass'n v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751 (1912); 
Norfolk .Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934). 
3. People ex rel. Chicago .Bar Ass'n v. Baker, 311 Ill. 66, 142 N.E. 554 (1924); Sim-
mons v. State, 12 Mo. 268, 49 Am. Dec. 131 (1849); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v • 
.Breckenridge, 126 Okla. 86, 258 Pac. 744 (1927). 
4. Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930); In re Mosher, 24 Okla. 61, 102 
Pac. 705 (1909); State v. Mannix, 133 Ore. 329, 288 Pac. 507 (1930); In re O'Brien, 95 
Vt. 167, 113 Atl. 527 (1922). · 
5. This privilege is not only included in the fifth amendment to the United 
States Constitution, but it is also in the constitutions of all but two of the states. 
In these two states, Iowa and New Jersey, it has been adopted by case law. See 8 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 318-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
6. In the Matter of Kaffenburgh, 188 N.Y. 49, 80 N.E. 570 (1907); Sheiner v. State, 
82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955); In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941); People 
ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 38 N.E. 303 (1894). 
7. Compare Cohen v. Hurley, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 166 N.E.2d 672 (1960), 
aff'd, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), and In the Matter of Vaughn, 189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353 
(1922), with Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955). See also People ex rel. Colorado 
Bar Ass'n v. Webster, 28 Colo. 223, 64 Pac. 207 (1901). 
8. 366 U.S. 117 (1961). 
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the attorney had breached his duty to cooperate with the courts by 
invoking the privilege contained in the New York Constitution.9 
The dissenters in Cohen stated that if the states were governed 
by the fifth amendment,10 state courts could not disbar an attorney 
merely because he had invoked the privilege.11 Subsequently, the 
Court held in Malloy v. H ogan12 that the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination was enforceable against the states through 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 13 and, in 
Griffin v. California,14 it held that no inference of guilt could be 
drawn merely because a person has invoked the privilege. The ques-
tion now arises whether, in light of those decisions, Cohen v. Hurley 
is still good law. A New York court recently stated that the Cohen 
decision is in no way impaired by Malloy,15 a conclusion which 
warrants examination. 
While no Supreme Court cases have dealt directly with an at-
torney's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination, the cases dealing with the assertion of the privilege 
by public employees are apposite, since attorneys are generally re-
garded as officers of the court,16 subject to its control as if they were 
9. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court in order 
to determine whether the New York courts' interpretation of the state constitution 
violated the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
IO. The relevant provision of the fifth amendment is as follows: "nor shall any 
person ••• be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, • • .'' 
The construction of this clause by the federal courts constituted the so-called "fed-
eral privilege" which before Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964), was enforced only 
against the federal government. 
11. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1961). 
12. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
13. The Court held that a conviction for contempt where the petitioner had re-
fused to answer questions in a state gambling investigation concerning the cir-
cumstances of an earlier gambling arrest was a violation of the "due process" clause, 
and hence illegal state action. Although the holding that this activity violated the 
"due process" clause would not necessarily mean that any conduct whicli violates the 
"federal privilege" also violates the "due process" clause, it is clear that the Court in-
tended Malloy to have this effect. According to Mr. Justice Brennan's doctrine of "selec-
tive incorporation," once any part of a right guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is in-
cluded· within the "due process" clause, the entire right is included. In other words, 
the federal and state governments are now subject to the same restrictions. See 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) (Bren• 
nan, J., dissenting). 
14. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
15. Matter of Spevack, 24 App. Div. 2d 653, aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 1048, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126 
(1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 942 (1966). The Griffin case was not mentioned in either 
of the New York courts' opinions. 
16. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932); In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 Atl. 
497 (1~7); Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. 
v. Beatie, 137 ill. 553, 27 N.E. 1096 (1891); Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 
782 (1960); In the Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65 (1934); Lynde v. 
Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 52 Atl. 694 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902). 
0 
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its employees.17 In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,18 the 
Court held that the discharge of a public employee based on infer-
ences of guilt19 drawn from his assertion of his fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination was a denial of due process.20 
The Court indicated, however, that there are circumstances in 
which a public employee may properly be discharged for refusing 
to answer questions, namely when the inquiry is directed toward his 
qualifications for employment.21 Although this case involved a 
state employee, the privilege was asserted during the course of a 
federal inquiry. Hence, the Slochower decision was an interpreta-
tion of the federal privilege against self-incrimination. Two later 
cases upheld a state's right to discharge a civil servant who invokes 
the privilege with respect to questions relating to his qualifications. 
In both Lerner v. Casey22 and Beilan v. Board of Public Education,23 
the Court distinguished between an investigation of an employee's 
qualifications and a general legislative investigation.24 However, in 
Nelson v. Los Angeles County,25 the Court apparently discarded this 
"type of inquiry" distinction by upholding the dismissal of an em-
ployee whose refusal to answer before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee was based on the privilege against self-incrim-
ination. The Nelson Court based its decision on the finding that 
the employee had violated his statutory duty of cooperation.26 
17. Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 364 (1868); Ex parte Thompson, 228 Ala. 
113, 152 So. 229 (1933); In re Clifton, 115 Fla. 168, 155 So. 324 (1934); West v. Field, 
181 Ga. 152, 181 S.E. 661 (1935); Bar Ass'n v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751 (1912); 
Norfolk & Plymouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934). 
18. 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
19. The inference was implicit in the state statute pursuant to which the employee 
was discharged. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 903 which provides: 
If any • • • employee of the city shall, after lawful notice or process, • • • refuse 
to testify or answer any questions regarding ••• official conduct of any officer or 
employee of the city ••. on the ground that his answer would tend to incrimi-
nate him, •.. his term or tenure of office or employment shall terminate .••• 
20. The Court rejected the Board of Education's contention that the assertion 
of the privilege necessarily indicates an unfitness to teach in so far as the person in-
voking the privilege must be either: (I) guilty of the offense for which he seeks 
protection; or (2) perjuring himself by misusing the privilege. 350 U.S. at 556-58 
(1956). 
21. 350 U.S. at 559 (1956). 
22. 357 U.S. 468 (1958). 
23. 357 U.S. 399 (1958). 
24. Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in Beilan emphasizes the fact 
that the court does so distinguish. The majority had upheld the discharge since it 
viewed the inquiry as one which went to the petitioner's qualifications. Warren was 
unable to agree with this factual determination; he believed that the dismissal prob-
ably resulted from the petitioner's previous assertion of the privilege before the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. Since Warren believed that the relevant 
investigation was not an investigation into the petitioner's qualifications, he was 
unable to uphold the discharge. 357 U.S. at 411 (1958). 
25. 362 U.S. I (1960). 
26. CAL. Gov'r CODE§ 1028.1: 
It shall be the duty of any public employee who may be subpoenaed or or-
dered by the governing body of the state or local agency by which such employee 
is employed, ••• or committee or subcommittee thereof, or by a duly authorized 
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Nelson, like Slochower, involved a federal investigation and hence 
it also was an interpretation of the federal privilege. In applying 
the privilege against self-incrimination to the states, Malloy did 
not create new dimensions to the privilege-it merely held th-e 
states to the federal standards. Thus, just as an employee can be 
discharged for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination in 
a federal investigation if the investigation goes to his qualifications 
or if, by asserting the privilege, the .employee violates a duty of 
cooperation, so the employee may be discharged for invoking the 
privilege in a state investigation under the same circumstances. 
Thus, Malloy does not erect any additional barriers to a state court's 
right to compel an attorney's cooperation so long as the judicial 
inquiries stay within the exceptions articulated in Slochower and 
Nelson.21 
A second group of relevant cases are those in which the attorney's 
duty of cooperation with investigating bodies, particularly those 
delving into his qualifications, has clashed with his first amendment 
privileges. In Konigsberg v. State Bar28 and In re Anastaplo,29 attor-
neys were denied admission to the bar for refusing to answer ques-
tions before committees of bar examiners.30 The applicants based 
their refusals to answer on their rights of free speech and free as-
sociation, protected from state interference by· the first and four-
teenth amendments,31 but in both cases the denial of admission to 
committee of the Congress of the United States or of the Legislature of this 
State ••• to appear ••• and to answer under oath a question or questions ••. 
[relating to his advocacy or knowledge of activities of any organization advocating 
the overthrow of the Government of the United States]. 
The Court held that this statute did not implicitly require the drawing of inferences 
of guilt, since rather than directly prohibiting assertion of the privilege, it merely 
imposed a positive duty to cooperate. This seemingly tenuous distinction between 
the statute in the principal case and the statute in Slochower (see note 19 supra) may 
in effect reduce Slochower to its particular facts: 
1) It was not a direct inquiry into the employee's qualifications. 
2) The employee was not aware that he would be discharged for asserting the 
privilege. 
3) The employee was dismissed without a hearing. 
4) The employee had previously answered the same questions before a state com-
mittee. 
27. However, it must be noted that the efficacy of the doctrine established in 
Lerner, Beilan and Nelson is doubtful because the dissenters in these cases have be-
come the majority in subsequent self-incrimination cases. See, e.g., Albertson v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965). Furthermore, Nelson was an af-
firmance by an equally divided Court; the Chief Justice did not participate in the 
decision. 
28. 366 U.S. 36 (1961). 
29. 366 U.S. 82 (1961). Again, it should be noted that in both cases, strong dissents 
were filed by the members of the "new majority." See note 27 supra. 
30. In both instances, the purpose underlying the committees' inquiries was to 
examine the qualifications of applicants for admission to the bar. 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech •••• " This provision has been held to apply to the states through the "due 
process" clause of the fourteenth amendment, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), 
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the bar was affirmed. The Court noted that these rights are not 
absolute, but rather, may be balanced against competing govern-
ment interests.32 In each of these cases, the Court held that the 
interest of the state in controlling membership of the bar out-
weighed the encroachment of the applicants' rights of free speech 
and association. However, although the state interest outweighs 
the applicants' first amendment rights, it does not necessarily follow 
that this interest will also outweigh the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, for the Court has never acknowledged that it is willing to 
balance the privilege against self-incrimination. 
While the Court is not willing to openly balance the fifth amend-
ment privilege, it is willing to distinguish certain factual situations 
in which the privilege cannot be invoked. In United States v. 
Kahriger,33 the Court upheld provisions of the Gambler's Registra-
tion Act, 34 which provided that all persons engaged in the business 
of accepting wagers must register their names and places of business 
with the Internal Revenue Bureau. In Shapiro v. United States,85 
the Court stated that certain records which are required by law to 
be maintained acquire "public aspects" and could not be protected 
by the privilege, since the privilege cannot be raised when "there 
is a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated 
and the public concern .... "36 The effect of these two cases is to 
deprive an individual of his privilege against self-incrimination 
when the interests of the state are sufficiently forceful. The privilege 
also seems to have been subject to this type of implicit balancing 
in Nelson and Lerner, where the right to invoke the privilege was 
impaired by the imposition of disabilities on those asserting it, 
since this encumbrancing of the privilege seems to have been a 
direct result of the competing state interest. Again, there seems to 
have been an implicit balancing in Orloff v. Willoughby,31 where a 
prospective army officer was denied a commission because, in re-
liance on his privilege against self-incrimination, he failed to answer 
questions concerning his loyalty. The Court noted that the inquiry 
with which he refused to cooperate was pertinent to his job qualifi-
cations and that there was a compelling government interest in the 
regulating of his vocation. Since the facts of Orloff are analogous 
to those in Cohen, Orloff would seem to be controlling, for certainly 
the states have a considerable interest in regulating the composi-
tion of the bar. 
32. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 
516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); United States v. Rumely, 345 
U.S. 41 (1953). 
33. 345 U.S. 22 (1953). 
34. 65 Stat. 530 (1951) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4401(c), 4411-12). 
35. 335 U.S. I (1948). 
36. Id. at 32. 
37. 345 U.S. 83 (1953). 
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While this result may seem harsh, the same practice is followed 
in any licensing procedure-an applicant is in effect compelled to 
provide information establishing his qualifications. Surely it could 
not be argued that an applicant, knowing that his answers would 
reveal that he is unqualified, may refuse to answer and yet demand 
that his license be granted. Since there is no constitutional right to 
retain a license,88 an investigation into whether a licensee has main-
tained his qualifications seems constitutionally indistinguishable 
from an investigation as to qualifications at the time of applica-
tion. 39 There seems to be no reason, therefore, why the duty to 
cooperate with an investigation into an attorney's qualifications 
could not be made an obligation which he must satisfy in order to 
retain his membership in the bar. 
In at least one instance, however, the privilege against self-in-
crimination will not be balanced: when the answers which the ques-
tions elicit may reveal information which could be used in con-
victing the attorney of a crime.40 The Court has made it quite clear 
that a state cannot constitutionally force a person, by placing him 
under a threat of contempt, to answer questions which may lead to 
his being convicted of a crime unless he is given complete immunity 
from prosecution.41 Whether a state can force an attorney to testify 
by granting him immunity from criminal prosecution and then 
use the information obtained to disbar him depends on the char-
acterization of disbarment, since the privilege is available only 
when used for protection from criminal prosecutions, or proceed-
ings which could result in a penalty or forfeiture.42 Obviously dis-
barment is not a criminal proceeding. Furthermore, although the 
Supreme Court has never addressed itself to the question whether 
disbarment is a penalty, it is unlikely that it would reach this result 
since it has always regarded as the primary purpose of a disbarment 
proceeding the protection of the public from persons unfit to prac-
tice law, rather than the punishment of the attomey.43 While it 
38. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365 (1882); Union Passenger Ry. 
v. Philadelphia, 101 U.S. 528 (1880); Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1877), 
overruled on other grounds sub nom. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 533 
(1922). 
39. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123 (1961). 
40. In Matter of Spevack, 24 App. Div. 2d 653, afj'd, 16 N.Y.2d 1048, 266 N.Y.S.2d 
126 (1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 942 (1966), there is a possibility that the attorney 
could be convicted of solicitation under N.Y. PENAL I.Aw § 270-a which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person ••. to solicit or procure through solicita-
.tion either directly or indirectly legal business, or to solicit or procure through 
solicitation a retainer, written or oral, or any agreement authorizing an attorney 
to perform or render legal services. 
41. Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1966). 
42. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). 
43. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882). The same is true of most state courts. 
Ex parte Thompson, 28 Ala. 113, 152 So. 229 (1933); In re Stone, 77 Ariz. 115, 267 
P.2d 892 (1954); In the Matter of Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940); Gould 
v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930); In re Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920); 
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could be argued that the seriousness of disbarment renders it penal, 
the Court has held that deportation, which involves an even more 
significant deprivation, is not a penalty, and, consequently, that 
inferences of guilt may be drawn from respondents' refusal to 
testify, even though the privilege against self-incrimination has been 
asserted.44 Since it thus appears that disbarment should not be 
characterized as a penalty, states may attain the same control ex-
ercised in Cohen, namely forcing an attorney to testify against him-
self in a disbarment proceeding, by granting him immunity from 
criminal prosecution.45 I£ the attorney answers the questions, the 
information can be used against him for disbarment. I£ he claims 
the privilege and refuses to answer, inferences of guilt which may 
lead to his disbarment may constitutionally be drawn from his 
silence. 
Thus, it would appear that despite Malloy' s enforcement of the 
fifth amendment privilege against the states, an attorney refusing to 
testify at an inquiry into his alleged misconduct by asserting the 
privilege against self-incrimination may constitutionally be disbarred 
if the alleged misconduct is not criminal. I£ the alleged misconduct 
is criminal in nature, however, the attorney may be disbarred only 
if he had been given immunity from criminal prosecution. 
In re Heirich, IO Ill. 2d 357, 140 N.E.2d 825 (1957); Keithley v. Stevens, 238 Ill. 199, 
87 N.E. 375 (1909); In re Edge, 282 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. 1955); In re Craven, 178 La. 372, 
151 So. 625 (1933); In the Matter of Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65 (1934); In re 
Randolph, 347 S.W.2d 91 (Mo.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 916 (1961); In the Matter 
of Pennica, 36 N.J.2d 401, 177 A.2d 721 (1962); see In the Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 
116 N.E. 782 (1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918); Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 117 
S.E.2d 300 (1960); cf. In the Matter of Solovei, 250 App. Div. 117, 293 N.Y. Supp. 640, 
afj'd, 276 N.Y. 647, 12 N.E.2d 802 (1937). 
Florida, which does not allow disbarment of attorneys for invoking the privilege 
against self-incrimination, Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955), does allow a 
person granted immunity from "penalty or forfeiture," FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1941), to 
be disbarred on the basis of evidence he produces. Florida Bar v. Massfeller, 170 So. 
2d 834 (Fla. 1964). 
44. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923); Dacosta v. Hol-
land, 151 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Cheng Chan Chu v. Shaughnessy, 127 F. 
Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
45. At the present time, almost all of the states have statutes which could be 
utilized. E.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE § 2247: 
In any investigation or proceeding ••• if a person refuses to answer a question 
or produce evidence of any other kind on the ground that he may be incrimi-
nated thereby, and, notwithstanding such refusal, an order is made ••• that such 
person answer the question or produce the evidence, such person shall comply 
with the order. If such person complies with the order, and if, but for this 
section he would have been privileged to withhold the answer given or the 
evidence produced by him, then immunity shall be conferred upon him •••• 
